Abstract. The standard solution for mutual authentication between human users and servers on the Internet is to execute a TLS handshake during which the server authenticates using a X.509 certificate followed by the authentication of the user either with own password or with some cookie stored within the user's browser. Unfortunately, this solution is susceptible to various impersonation attacks such as phishing as it turned out that average Internet users are unable to authenticate servers based on their certificates. In this paper we address security of cookie-based authentication using the concept of strong locked same origin policy for browsers introduced at ACM CCS'07. We describe a cookie-based authentication protocol between human users and TLS-servers and prove its security in the extended formal model for browserbased mutual authentication introduced at ACM ASIACCS'08. It turns out that the small modification of the browser's security policy is sufficient to achieve provably secure cookie-based authentication protocols considering the ability of users to recognize images, video, or audio sequences.
Introduction
Motivation The browser plays an indispensable function as the user's interface to access the rich world of Web based services. In order to serve the purpose of an universal client, commodity browsers have been augmented with numerous functionalities. Examples include extensions of the HTTP header to control caching and transport cookies, or the HTML markup language to enable high-level scripting and supply technologies like AJAX, AFLEX or SOAP. By contrast, much effort to amend the browser security model and provide new cryptographic services has not been spent. Since its adaption more than a decade ago [9] , the Transport Layer Security (TLS) framework is the main pillar of browser-based protocols to provide Web applications with a security layer. After the protocol framework has been peer-reviewed without finding any significant vulnerabilities [22, 24, 25, 28] , it has been believed to be the holy grail for secure Web authentication. However, recent studies point out that average-skilled Internet users understand neither TLS nor its indication in commodity Web browsers at all [7, 27] . Users tend to ignore browser's warnings and prefer to identify Web sites on the basis of non-technical indicators (e.g., brands, logos). This attitude provides a wrong sense of security. An adversary may fake the site and disclose the user's password ("phishing attacks"). The advent of these large-scale fraud attacks has led to several modifications in the visualization of TLS. Unfortunately, it seems to turn out that the changes do not meet their high expectations either [16] .
Another line of research addresses the design of authentication protocols that provide user-awareness. The essence of user-aware protocols is to relax the assumptions on user behavior and provide secure authentication ceremonies. Recently, the authors of this paper introduced a formal security model for browser-based mutual authentication (BBMA) between a human user and a server where the browser is modeled as the mediator of the communication [11] . Their model is an extension of the classical model for authentication from [3] towards consideration of user-awareness within the authentication protocols on the Internet whereby user-awareness is modeled via human perceptible authenticators (HPAs) that are implied by natural human senses, such as recognition of images, videos, and audio sequences. In addition to the model, [11] describes a protocol called BBMA (based on the ideas of the PassMark Security Inc.'s Two-Factor-Two-Way Authentication TM ) which can be implemented within the standard specification of the TLS protocol. In this protocol the human user authenticates via password which is typed into an HTML form only after the successful recognition of some expected HPA sent by the server. In order to protect the disclosure of this HPA to unauthorized parties, the TLS protocol uses client (possibly self-generated) certificates which serve as a cryptographic identifier for the corresponding HPA.
Extending this line of research, we deal with user-awareness in cookie-based authentication protocols. These protocols execute a server-only authenticated TLS session, where the user authenticates through a cookie that has been previously set by the server and stored in the browser's cache. The technique has the advantage that the user is refrained from retyping the password. Further, the cookie is taken from a sufficiently large random distribution. There is no need to expect a "security defect" due to the use of low-entropy passwords. These simplifications of user authentication have led to a wide adaption of cookie-based authenticated channels in browser-based protocols and there are many protocols that build upon this technique. Unfortunately, they have been shown to be vulnerable when taking the mature browser security model into account (see Section 2 for more discussions). The crux is that the browser decides on the basis of the server's domain name whether to reveal the cookie. The adversary is feasible to steal the cookie by spoofing the domain names and there are many attacks allowing the adversary to do this (e.g., dynamic pharming, DNS rebinding [15, 19] .
To protect against the growing presence of these threats, Karlof et. al. propose refinements of the browser's cookie disclosure policy [19, 23] . Their contribution is to augment the browser with some additional functionality which uses cryptographic mechanisms to enforce restricted access policies without relying on DNS, dubbed the strong locked same origin (SLSO) policy. In the context of cookie-based authentication protocols over the TLS channel, the SLSO policy enforcement means that the browser sends a cookie to the server only after the server proves the possession of a valid cryptographic identifier, namely the server's public key, i.e., the server proves the knowledge of the corresponding private key.
Contributions In this paper we extend our model from [11] towards cookie-based authentication and consideration of the browser's SLSO policy. Using the extended model we analyze the security of the cookie-based version of BBMA from [11] re-engineered under the SLSO policy. We call the modified protocol BBMA-SLSO. It turns out that some minor changes of the browser security model to enforce the SLSO policy-which is a straightforward task compared to the large scale deployment of, say secure domain name resolution protocols (DNSSEC)-turns an insecure protocol into a provably secure one. Additionally, the use of SLSO policy allows us to eliminate the costly use of the client certificates, which are essential to prove security of BBMA. In addition to the formal security definition, BBMA-SLSO has additional advantages over previous cookiebased authentication protocols. The advantages include 1. BBMA-SLSO is user-aware. In order to authenticate, the server sends a HPA, which serves (i) as non-cryptographic identifier for the user to validate the server as in the physical world where identities are provided in an easily recognizable fashion and (ii) as fail-stop mechanism to hamper that she discloses private information on a faked site. 2. BBMA-SLSO fits into the standard TLS specification. There is no need to modify commodity server implementations. In fact, the necessary augmentations address browsers, more precisely their functionality to access cookies corresponding to the SLSO policy. See [23] for more details.
We remark that the enforcement of the SLSO policy is ineligible to protect against cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. The anatomy of XSS attacks is to exploit weaknesses of application servers and inject malicious scripts into the communication that enable the adversary to invoke certain browser functionalities. Since the scripts are in the same security context the SLSO policy does not help. Consequently, the adversary would have access to the user's password typing, the cookie and HPA in BBMA-SLSO. Though we treat XSS attacks as (server) corruptions in our model and exclude them in the analysis, a work-around to make BBMA-SLSO resistant against the attacks is to completely isolate the named security critical information and prevent that they are accessible from the surrounding (potentially malicious) scripts. Such a feature is already available in the Internet Explorer for cookies [21] . The approach has to be extended for passwords and HPAs. Since the implementation of the SLSO policy requires the modification of the current browser's security policy anyway, we suggest to enrich this policy with the private/public tagging of elements. An element such as a password field tagged with a private value shall signal the browser that any script is prevented from access, regardless of its security context. See [10] for more details.
Organization The remainder sections are structured as follows. We review related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the formal security model for cookiebased BBMA protocols under consideration of the SLSO policy. In Section 4 we specify a concrete protocol called BBMA-SLSO using the high level description of the TLS handshake in the key transport mode and prove that it is user-aware and satisfies the defined authentication requirement. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
So far, few browser-based protocols have been subject to rigorous security analysis: Kormann and Rubin [20] show that Microsoft's .NET passport, a Web-based realization of the Kerberos protocol for single sign on, is susceptible to attacks where the adversary steals the ticket granting ticket cookie. Soghoian and Jakobsson [31] investigate the SiteKey-protocol that displays a previously negotiated image in addition to password forms in order to signal that the user is connected to the benign server. The authors show the feasibility of stealing the shared secret that is stored in a cookie. Groß [12] analyzes SAML, an alternative single sign on protocol, and shows that the protocol is vulnerable to adaptive attacks where the adversary intercepts the authentication token contained in the URL. By contrast, BBMA-SLSO has formal security arguments and is provably secure in a model which takes into account the adversarial control over the network and attacks against the classical browser's security policies that reveal weak identifiers, such as cookies.
Groß et al. prove in [14] the security of WS-Federation passive Requestor Profilea browser-based protocol for federated identity management. The proof is carried out in the browser model [13] that builds on the Reactive Simulatability framework due to Pfitzmann and Waidner [26] . The model abstracts away the TLS-protected channel through an ideal functionality that captures the same cryptographic task and presupposes ideal users who are able to identify servers based on certificates. There exists no soundness proof that TLS is simulatable and realizes such functionality, especially with respect to the relaxed user behavior assumptions. BBMA-SLSO takes explicitly into account the TLS protocol and is shown to be provably secure in the Random Oracle Model when instantiated with the widely deployed key transport cipher suite in server authentication mode.
Modeling BBMA with SLSO Policy
In this section we extend our security model for browser-based mutual authentication from [11] towards consideration of cookie-based authentication and the SLSO policy implemented within the browser.
Protocol Participants and Communication Model
User, Browser, Server, and their Long-Lived Keys Let U denote a human user for whom we do not make any further assumptions except for the ability to use some naturally born senses. We assume that U remembers some (high-entropy) human perceptible authenticator (HPA) w ∈ W (e.g. an image or a video/audio sequence from some space W) as its long-lived key LL U .
To the contrary, the browser B and the server S are modeled as PPT machines. LL B is the browser's high-entropy long-lived key which contains (S, pk S , cky) where S is the identity (domain name) of the server, pk S ∈ {0, 1} p1(κ) its certified public key, and cky ∈ {0, 1} p2(κ) is the cookie set by S during the establishment of the security association with the client which is denoted by C = (U, B). (Here and in the following,
] is a polynomial and κ ∈ N the security parameter.) We assume that cky contains secret information (e.g. obfuscated or cryptographically processed password) which allows S to uniquely identify U. Similarly, LL S contains the private key sk S ∈ {0, 1} p1(κ) and the tuple (U, cky, w). Additionally, by C we denote the traditional client given by a pair (U, B).
Communication between B and U via render-Function Let λ i : N → N, i ∈ [1, 2] be two polynomials. B communicates to U through the visualization function render :
is the message space (space of all HTML messages) and Ψ ∈ {0, 1} λ2(κ) is the browser's configuration for message processing that may be altered by querying the browser's DOM model.
Modeling User-Awareness via recognize-Function Similar to [11] we assume that U can recognize some previously remembered high-entropy HPA w ∈ W. The recognition is handled by a boolean human perception function recognize : M * × W → {0, 1} which on input a visualized message m * ∈ M * and w the recognize function outputs 1 if U recognizes w among the content of m * ; otherwise the output is 0. In this paper we assume that if m * contains w (denoted as m * |w) then recognize outputs 1, i.e., the ability of U to recognize w is perfect. On the other hand, we do not assume that w is the only HPA for which recognize outputs 1, i.e., we do not idealize U as there can be some set W * ⊆ W which contains HPAs that are perfectly human-indistinguishable from U according to the following definition.
Definition 1 (Perfect Human-Indistinguishability of HPAs). Let w ∈ W be some given HPA. For any m * ∈ M * and any w * ∈ W, we say that w and w * are perfectly human-indistinguishable, if for any human user U
where the probabilities are computed over the choices of w * . By W * ⊆ W we denote the set of all perfectly human-indistinguishable HPAs for some given w ∈ W assuming that w ∈ W * .
The main idea in designing user-aware security protocols based on HPAs is to opt for authenticators for which W * is sufficiently small for most of the users. In this case the probability that an adversary chooses or guesses some HPA that cannot be distinguished from w by U can be kept low. The ideal case would be if W * would consist only of w. We call w a good HPA if the size of the set W * is sufficiently small such that the term |W * |/|W| which is used in our proof beside other cryptography-related terms to compute the overall probability of a successful attack is negligible.
For our protocol we assume that the HPA used by U in the execution of our protocol is good. We stress that in order to identify good HPAs extensive user experiments, possibly under consideration of specific statistic models, have to be conducted. We conjecture that good HPAs may be found from the personal digital images, audio and even video sequences.
Protocol Sessions and Participating Instances Participation of C = (U, B) and S in distinct executions of Π is modeled via instances [C, sid C ] and [S, sid S ] where sid C , sid S ∈ N are respective session ids and if sid C = sid S then the instances are partnered -belong to the same session. We sometimes write C and S instead of their instances when the difference is visible from the context.
Execution Stages
Once initialized with the corresponding long-lived key an instance [C, sid C ] or [S, sid S ] is marked as used and turns into the stand-by stage where it waits for an invocation to execute the protocol. Upon receiving such invocation the instance turns into a processing stage where it proceeds according to the protocol specification until it collects enough information to decide whether the execution was successful or not, and to terminate then. If the execution is successful then we say that the instance accepts before it terminates; otherwise we say it aborts. The acceptance of [C, sid C ] with C = (U, B) is implied by the acceptance of U regardless of B, as U is the ultimate endpoint of the communication and controls the browser. However, [C, sid C ] aborts if either U or B does so.
Security Model
In the following we specify attacks and security goals for BBMA protocols from the perspective of fixed identities S and (U, B).
Assumptions on the Initialization
We assume that the establishment of the security association between S and (U, B) during which B receives (certified) pk S and cky, and S receives w is trusted. In practice, this can be done through the execution of the very first TLS handshake in the key transport mode under the assumption that this first session is not compromised. We remark that this assumption has practical substantiation. For example, assume that the protocol should be deployed for the login access to the online banking service of some bank U F B (for User Friendly Bank). If some U who does not have any online banking account at U F B receives phishing emails with the invitation to access some fake website of U F B there will be no damage even if U accepts. However, after U subscribes for the corresponding online service of U F B and receives the user guide that usually includes information on the connection establishment, it is likely that U, especially if U is technology-unaware and has no experience in online banking, will follow the guidelines, at least for the very first session in which the required security association through the upload of w will be established. Thus, for a successful attack the phishing email should be received by U in the time period between the subscription and the registration on the site.
Assumptions on the Adversary The PPT adversary A controls all communication between the protocol parties. This implies:
-A controls the domain name resolution. This also allows A to mount phishing and pharming attacks. Due to the SLSO policy we assume that the adversary can establish security association (S , pk S , cky ) with the client (U, B) for any server identity S as long as it can prove the knowledge of the corresponding private key sk S . 3 Upon sending forged domain resolution responses, the adversary obtains access to the parts of the browser's DOM model which are not protected by the policy. Note also that since the human recognizable authenticator is not cached, it can not be accessed using the DOM model. -A can issue public keys which B accepts. There is no trusted third party in the sense of a trusted CA. Hence, a certified public key in a X.509 server certificate is treated as a public key that can be identified by a unique identifier (i.e., hash value of the public key). -A is unable to corrupt B. Note that in this model we do not deal with malware 4 attacks against B and S, therefore, do not consider the case where A reveals the ephemeral and long-lived secrets stored inside B. In particular this implies that the adversary is not able to access the secure cookie cky unless its request is successfully verified by B based on the SLSO policy. By the same token we do not consider attacks resulting from the physical access of the adversary to the user's digital device running B.
-A is unable to corrupt S. Note also that in this model we do not deal with malware attacks against the server. This means that the adversary is excluded from revealing the ephemeral and long-lived secrets stored inside S.
Adversarial Queries A can participate in the actual protocol execution via the following queries:
-Execute(C, S): A eavesdrops the execution of the new protocol session between C and S and receives its transcript. -Invoke(C, S): U starts the protocol execution with the new instance of S using the associated instance of browser B and A obtains the first protocol message returned by B (which is usually generated on some input received from U, e.g., the entered URL). -Send(P, m): In an active attack A can send a message to some (instance) of P ∈ {U, B, S} whereby messages addressed to U are implicitly handled as messages addressed to the associated browser B with the subsequent execution of render(m, Ψ ) and visualization of its output to U. A receives the response which P generates after having processed m according to the specification of Π (or an empty string if m is unexpected). -RevealState(B): A receives information stored within the browser's state Ψ and which is not protected via the SLSO policy. Additionally, it returns (S, pk S ), i.e., A may learn which servers have security associations with the client, without learning their secure cookies. 3 Assuming that the initialization process is done during the trusted TLS key transport session between (U, B) and S, the adversary must be able to decrypt messages encrypted with pk S . Under the assumption that the deployed asymmetric encryption scheme is sufficiently secure the decryption operation can be seen as the required proof of possession. 4 Consideration of malware attacks and augmentation of the proposed model with Trusted Computing functionalities to model resistance against malware attacks is surely an interesting aspect for the future work on security of browser-based protocols.
-SetCKY(B, (S , pk S , cky )): With this query (which is new in comparison to [11] ) A sets up a new security association with (U, B) on behalf of some server S as long as pk S = pk S (note that due to our assumptions that A controls the domain name resolution and can issue certificates that B will accept we explicitly allow S to be equal to S.) A receives the HPA w ∈ W chosen by U such that it is distinguishable from w, i.e., w ∈ W * according to the Definition 1.
5
Correctness and Browser-Based Mutual Authentication The following definition specifies the correctness requirement for BBMA protocols.
Definition 2 (Correctness).
A BBMA protocol Π is correct if each Execute(C, S) query results in two instances, [C, sid C ] and [S, sid S ] which are partnered (sid C = sid S ) and accept prior to termination.
In the following we define the main security requirement of browser-based mutual authentication between participating U and S with B acting as a mediator of the communication.
Definition 3 (Browser-Based Mutual Authentication). Let Π be a correct protocol according to Definition 2 and Game bbma Π (A, κ) the interaction between the instances of C = (U, B) and S with a PPT adversary A who is allowed to query Execute, Invoke, Send, RevealState, and SetCKY. We say that A wins if at some point during the interaction:
The maximum probability of this event (over all adversaries running in time κ) is denoted Succ The first requirement ensures that U authenticates to the matching server S. Since the acceptance of [C, sid C ] with C = (U, B) is implied by the acceptance of U the second requirement ensures that S authenticates to the matching user U. In both cases B plays the role of the mediator of the communication and can be queried by A; thus, not mentioning B in the above definition would be incorrect from the formal point of view.
User-Aware BBMA over TLS with the SLSO Policy
In this section we specify the BBMA-SLSO protocol which can be seen as the modification of the BBMA protocol from [11] towards cookie-based authentication and SLSO policy.
Building Blocks of BBMA-SLSO

TLS Protocol
The main pillar of BBMA-SLSO is the server authenticated key transport, where the server's identity is a cryptographic value independent from the Internet infrastructure. This complies with RSA-based ciphersuites as specified in [1] . These suites are preferentially negotiated between standard browsers and servers.
Cryptographic Primitives BBMA-SLSO uses (well-known) cryptographic primitives that are deployed in the cryptographic key transport suites of the TLS protocol, namely:
p3(κ) × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * . Note that TLS defines PRF with data expansion s.t. it can be used to obtain outputs of a variable length which becomes useful for the key extraction phase. We refer to [8] for the proof that the key extraction function in TLS is indeed pseudo-random. By Adv prf PRF (κ) we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within security parameter κ) in distinguishing the outputs of PRF from those of a random function better than by a random guess. -A symmetric encryption scheme which provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The symmetric encryption operation is denoted Enc and the corresponding decryption operation Dec. By Adv ind−cpa (Enc,Dec) (κ) we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within security parameter κ) in breaking the IND-CPA property of (Enc, Dec) better than by a random guess; -An IND-CPA secure asymmetric encryption scheme whose encryption operation is denoted E and the corresponding decryption operation D. By Adv
(κ) we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within security parameter κ) in breaking the IND-CPA property of (E, D) better than by a random guess; Note that the general case of RSA-OAEP encryption which is used in the TLS key transport mode has been proven in [29] based on the assumptions of the Random Oracle Model [4] to satisfy indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), which is stronger than IND-CPA. Also [18] provides such proof which is tailored specifically to the construction used in the TLS protocol. Still, we emphasize that for the security of BBMA-SLSO the weaker requirement of IND-CPA which is implied by IND-CCA2 is fully sufficient.
-A cryptographic collision-resistant hash function Hash : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} p4(κ) . By Succ coll Hash (κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within security parameter κ) in finding a collision, i.e., a pair (m, m ) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * s.t. Hash(m) = Hash(m ). -A digital signature scheme which provides existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA). The signing operation is denoted Sig and the corresponding verification operation V er. By Succ euf −cma (Sig,V er) (κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within security parameter κ) given access to the signing oracle in finding a forgery; -The well-known message authentication code function HMAC which is believed to satisfy weak unforgeability under chosen message attacks (WUF-CMA) [2] .
Here we remark that security of HMAC is not relevant for the security analysis of BBMA-SLSO. A detailed look on the protocol from the formal perspective shows that using HMAC is redundant since all HMAC values are encrypted prior to the transmission. Nevertheless, we do not omit protocol parts where HMAC is computed from our description since this is what happens in the today's execution of TLS.
SLSO Policy in BBMA-SLSO During the initialization procedure which is assumed to be trusted server S establishes a security association with the client (U, B) using the TLS protocol in key transport with its (certified) public key. For the successful verification of the SLSO policy in subsequent connections B stores pk S and the http cookie provided by S. This cookie contains information which allows S to authenticate U. On each connection with S, B has to make a decision whether to send cky or not. Following the definition of the SLSO policy in [19] , B decides by comparing the public key used by the candidate server during that particular TLS handshake to the stored pk S . If the keys are equal then cky is transmitted, otherwise not. However, since the browser is a very general piece of software that must be able to communicate with any http server on the Internet, we design BBMA-SLSO in such a way that it does not abort the communication if this verification fails; otherwise this would pose a lot of compatibility problems and could be seen as an impractical solution. Instead, if the verification fails, the browser will simply continue with the protocol, by sending the empty cookie which we consider as some constant publicly known value ζ ∈ {0, 1} p2(κ) . In this way the decision on whether the communication should be continued or not is mitigated to S, which will normally abort the communication since otherwise U remains unauthenticated.
Protocol Description
In the following we describe the execution of the BBMA-SLSO protocol specified in Figure 1 . Let l 1 , l 2 , l 3 and l 4 denote the publicly known labels specified in TLS for the instantiation of PRF. (We write in parenthesis the corresponding standard TLS messages.)
Initiate the Protocol. The user U initiates the protocol by communicating server's U RL to the own browser B. Upon resolving the corresponding address B chooses his own nonce r C of length p 5 (κ) at random and forwards it to S (ClientHello). In response S chooses own random nonce r S and a TLS session identifier sid of length p 5 (κ) and appends it to the own certificate cert S (ServerHello). We stress that sid chosen by S is not the session identifier sid S used in our security model but a value specified in TLS.
Negotiate Key Material. B chooses a pre-master secret k p of length p 3 (κ) at random and sends it to S encrypted with the received public key pk S (ClientKeyExchange) taken from the servers certificate Cert S . The pre-master secret k p is used to derive the master secret k m through a pseudo-random function PRF on input (l 1 , r C |r S ) with k p as the secret seed. This key derivation is performed based on the standard TLS pseudorandom function PRF (see [1, Sect. 5] ). The master secret is then used as a secret seed for the instantiation of the pseudo-random function PRF on input (l 2 , r C |r S ) to derive the session keys k 1 |k 2 used to encrypt and authenticate session messages exchanged between B and S. TLS specifies the generation of six session keys: A symmetric encryption key, a MAC key, and an IV for block ciphers only (either for client and server). For simplicity, we denote k 1 as the encryption key and k 2 as the authentication key which are the same for B and S. Here we remark that as shown later in our security analysis the use of different keys for encryption and authentication in TLS is redundant from the formal point of view. The reason is that each computed HMAC value is encrypted using k 1 prior to its transmission over the network. Since the computed value k 1 |k 2 can be seen as a single output of PRF the security of the applied encryption scheme is already sufficient to achieve symmetric authentication of the encrypted message.
Session Key Confirmation. B confirms the session key generation, i.e., F C is the first message that is authenticated via HMAC computed with k 2 and encrypted via the symmetric encryption scheme computed with k 1 . F C is computed as output of PRF on input (l 3 , h 1 ) with k m as the secret seed; whereby h 1 denotes the hash value computed over all messages previously processed by B (ClientFinished). Further, S generates k m and derives the session keys (k 1 , k 2 ) in a similar way. S uses the own session keys (k 1 , k 2 ) to ensure that it communicates with B through the verification of F C . If the verification fails, S aborts the protocol. Otherwise, it confirms the negotiated session parameters, using PRF on input (l 4 , h 2 ) with k m as secret seed; whereby h 2 denotes the hash value over the received messages. The output of PRF is first authenticated via HMAC computed with k 2 and then encrypted via the symmetric encryption scheme computed with k 1 (ServerFinished). The client C checks this message analogously.
Mutual Authentication between Browser and Server. The browser B now exploits the fact that the server S has been authenticated in the previous step by showing that he knows the private key associated with pk S . This value is used as a key to the credential store of the browser, and the corresponding cookie cky is retrieved and sent to the server, encrypted with k 1 together with the attached message authentication code computed using k 2 .
Human Perceptible Server Authentication. The server selects the HPA w associated with cky, and sends it (encrypted with k 1 together with the attached message authentication code computed using k 2 ) for display to the browser. We call the message in a high-level description the HumanAuth message. B communicates the decrypted authenticator to U through execution of the render function which takes as input the authenticator w and state Ψ and outputs the visualization of w named w * . The abstract human perception function recognize is used to model the ability of U to decide whether the authenticator w * matches the original authenticator w which is shared with S after the initialization stage.
Before we continue with the security analysis we reemphasize the triangular model of authentication in BBMA-SLSO. When verifying F S , B knows the identity of S. B resolves pk S to look up for the corresponding cookie cky. If no matching triple (S,pk S , cky) exists, B sends an empty cookie ζ and continues with the protocol (it is now in responsibility of the server to abort); otherwise, B continues by sending cky confidentially to S.
However, TLS in server authentication mode does not prevent U from contacting to a rogue server in order to disclose sensitive information. When verifying w * through the execution of recognize, U is sure to be communicating to S through B, since S is the only owner of w apart from U. Upon this stage, the protocol ensures that S is authenticated to U. 
Security Analysis
In the following we argue on the security of the proposed BBMA-SLSO protocol. We recall that the goal of the protocol is to provide mutual authentication between U and S communicating via B according to Definition 3.
Theorem 1 (BBMA-Security). Let q denote the total number of executed protocol sessions during the interaction with an adversary A participating in Game Proof. (Sketch) In this proof we apply the meanwhile classical proving technique from [30] . We construct a sequence of games G i , i = 0, . . . , 14 and denote by Win i the event that adversary A breaks the mutual authentication of the protocol in game G i , i.e., wins in the corresponding interaction as described in Definition 3.
Game G 0 . [Real protocol] This is the real Game bbma BBMA-SLSO (κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the server S and the browser B according to the natural protocol specification and answers all queries of A. Although we treat the human user U as part of ∆ we explicitly assume that U performs the simulated tasks on its own.
Game G 1 . [Same TLS Session Id] In this game the simulation aborts if during the interaction the simulator chooses the same TLS session id sid on behalf of B in two different protocol sessions. Considering the probability for the collision of two random choices we obtain
